Abstract: In this paper, we consider a population of individuals who di¤er in two dimensions: their risk type (expected loss) and their risk aversion. We solve for the pro…t maximizing menu of contracts that a monopolistic insurer wants to put out on the market. We …nd that it is never optimal to fully separate all the types. Secondly, a su¢ ciently high risk aversion heterogeneity means that some high risk people (the risk tolerant ones) will get lower coverage than some low risk people (the risk averse ones). Thirdly, we show that when the average man and woman di¤er only in risk aversion, gender discrimination may lead to a Pareto improvement in the insurance market. JEL code: D82, G22
Introduction
Individuals who seek insurance di¤er from each other in many respects. At least two of these di¤erences are of central importance for insurance companies and for insurance market outcomes: the distribution of losses that insurance takers face, and their willingness to bear the risk of those losses. 1 Empirically, heterogeneity in the second characteristic is not negligible. Aarbu and Schroyen (2011) , for example, …nd that the degree of relative risk aversion among Norwegians averages above four with a standard deviation of about three.
Insurance market theory has primarily focussed on the consequences of private information on the loss distribution, and to a lesser extent on the case in which information on risk aversion is private, but has rarely studied situations in which private information applies to both characteristics. 2 Moreover, analysis of the two-dimensional private-information problem has been restricted to competitive markets; i.e., a setting in which several insurers compete for clients. In this paper, we study the opposite setting by asking how a monopolist would design a contract menu intended to attract agents who hold not only private information on their loss distribution, but also on their risk preferences.
Adding risk aversion heterogeneity to the analysis of insurance markets calls for a multidimensional hidden information model. Such an analysis is technically not straightforward, because the existence of private information in two or more dimensions implies that the ordering of agents according to their willingness to pay for extra coverage becomes endogenous. In other words, the ordering depends on the contract. To see this, consider two contracts: one with very partial coverage and one with almost full coverage. When o¤ered the former contract, a highly risk-averse agent facing a low risk may be more willing to pay for additional coverage than a risk-tolerant agent facing a high risk, while the situation could be the other way around for the latter contract. Technically, the indi¤erence curves of these "intermediate" 1 A third factor, that will not be discussed here, is the moral stance of insurees, determining the amount of false claims that insurers have to deal with each year. 2 Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) analyse a perfectly competitive insurance market with private information on the distribution of losses. Stiglitz (1977, Sections 3 and 4) , and Landsberger and Meilijson (1996) analyse a monopolist insurer. Stiglitz (1977, Section 5) and Landsberger and Meilijson (1994) analyse the outcomes under monopoly when private information is held on risk attitude.
insurance takers cross twice, and this invalidates standard solution methods. 3 There is a scant literature on solutions to multidimensional screening problems. One branch of this literature is methodological and deals with a principal-agent setting, as we do-see, e.g., the "user's guide"by Armstrong and Rochet (1999) . It turns out, however, that our insurance problem does not lend itself to being solved by the techniques proposed therein, the main reason being that our problem has two hidden characteristics, but only one instrument-the degree of coverage. 4 A second branch of literature deals with multidimensional screening in insurance markets, but restricts itself to competitive markets. In this literature, it is usually assumed that each insurance company o¤ers a single contract. 5 In a monopolistic setting such as ours, such a restriction would render the analysis trivial and unrealistic. By assuming that the monopolist o¤ers a menu of contracts, the relative 3 Jullien et al. (2007) analyse whether the single crossing property holds in the general monopolistic screening model with moral hazard and in which agents di¤er in their risk preferences. For more information on the role of this property in a competitive insurance market with the same informational assumptions and moral hazard, see De Donder and Hindriks (2009) . 4 Armstrong and Rochet (1999) study a problem in which the agent has quasilinear and separable preferences on two action levels and a transfer. The principal has similar preferences but she is unsure whether the agent has a high or low valuation for either of the two activities. A contract speci…es a transfer and two activity levels. In our problem, there is only one "activity", i.e., insurance coverage. An agent's willingness to pay for coverage depends on both her risk level and risk aversion. On the other hand, the insurer's willingness to o¤er coverage depends on the level of risk, but not on the agent's risk aversion. Risk aversion only indirectly determines contract pro…tability through the rents that must be left for incentive compatibility reasons. To sum up, we have a screening problem with two hidden characteristics, one of which is a common value, and with one instrument. This also makes our problem di¤erent from those of Armstrong (1999) (who incorporates one instrument and two common value characteristics) and Dana (1993) (two instruments, two common value characteristics). 5 This de facto means that the main results are driven by the lack of order between what we refer to as "intermediate types"; namely, by those whose indi¤erence curves cross twice. This explains why some authors only consider these intermediate types (e.g., Wambach, 2000) . Although Smart (2000) and Villeneuve (2003) consider the full set of types, they maintain the assumption that each company o¤ers a single contract per risk class. In some models with multidimensional private information, it is possible to reduce the dimensionality by a so-called type aggregator-see, e.g., De Donder and Hindricks (2007) for a political economy social insurance context. In a context closer to ours, Crocker and Snow (2011) assume that an insurance taker may face di¤erent kinds of loss (…re, theft, etc.). Since the probability for each kind of loss is private information, the insurer must engage in multidimensional screening. However, because risk classi…cation based on observables is assumed su¢ ciently …ne, the problem can be reduced to single dimensional private information.
proportion of the non-intermediate types play a role that is as crucial as the non-single crossing of intermediate types'indi¤erence curves. Hence, the problem of the failure of the single crossing condition-brought about by the intermediate types-is compounded in the monopolistic setting by the necessity of dealing with non-intermediate types in the design of the optimal menu of contracts.
Our main objective is to characterize this optimal menu. We establish three results: (i) it is always optimal to pool some of the types (i.e., full separation of types is never optimal); (ii) unlike in the one-dimensional case, exclusion of some high-risk individuals from insurance may be optimal; and (iii) some low-risk individuals may end up with more coverage than some high-risk individuals.
Next, we address two issues that have received much recent attention. The …rst one is methodological. In testing for the presence of asymmetric information in insurance markets, the question is whether the absence of signi…cant positive correlation between risk and coverage (i.e., the absence of adverse selection) should be taken as indicative of the absence of asymmetric information. Chiappori et al. (2006) derive the testable prediction that in a su¢ ciently competitive insurance market with asymmetric information, the observable risk should be related to coverage in a positively monotonic way. Notice that this is stronger than requiring a positive correlation between coverage and risk. We show when this result goes through in our monopolistic setting, and when it does not. In the latter case, we also show when risk and coverage can be statistically positively correlated, and when they cannot. In this sense, our results corroborate the role of the su¢ cient competition assumption for the Chiappori et al. (2006) result. Our analysis also adds to the list of possible explanations for the lack of evidence supporting the existence of asymmetric information the combination of market power and preference heterogeneity. 6 Other explanations in the (growing) list are: (i) endogenous heterogeneity in risks because of moral hazard (see, e.g., Cutler et al., 2008) ; (ii) endogenous wealth heterogeneity (Netzer and Scheuer, 2007) ; and (iii) the insurer having privileged information on risks (Villeneuve, 2000) .
The second issue concerns the possible welfare consequences of the ban on the use of gender discrimination in insurance that will take e¤ect from December 2012 in the European Union. This ban extends the principle of equal treatment of women and men in the access to and the supply of goods and services to the insurance industry. 7;8 This will surely a¤ect the insurance sector, because of the common practice of di¤erentiating premia according to gender when underwriting life, health and car accident risks. Regarding life insurance, it has been argued that if one controls for lifestyle, environmental factors, and social class, "the di¤erence in average life expectancy between men and women lies between zero and two years" and therefore that "the practice of insurers to use sex as a determining factor in the evaluation of risk is based on ease of use rather than on real value as a guide to life expectancy." (Commission of the European Communities, 2003: 6) Not surprisingly, European insurer carriers have reacted …ercely to the proposed ban, arguing that removing gender would weaken their ability to assess risk and that gender-neutral calculation would increase the premia for many of their products, especially for women (Financial Times, November 3, 2003, p. 2). We show that even if-as the Commission claims-gender does not provide any information on the underlying risk, if it does provide (imperfect) information on an individual's risk aversion (as empirical research suggests), then allowing the monopolist to condition the terms of the insurance contract on gender may be Pareto improving. We provide su¢ cient conditions for such an improvement to arise.
From a technical point of view, we have taken a new approach to the analysis of screening insurance takers that simpli…es the problem and is appealing from a modelling point of view. Rather than following the standard set-up in which the individual faces the possibility of a single monetary loss, we assume that the loss is normally distributed and that agents di¤er in their expected losses, which can be high or low. If the insurance indemnity is linear in the loss, as is the case under a reimbursement insurance scheme with a constant co-insurance rate, the …nal income will also be normally distributed. Endowing agents with a utility function that displays constant absolute risk 7 Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services (O¢ cial Journal of the European Union 2004 L 373, p. 37) 8 The gender directive of 2004 did provide for a derogation that allowed member states to permit gender-speci…c di¤erences in insurance premiums and bene…ts in so far as gender is a determining risk factor that can be substantiated by relevant and accurate actuarial and statistical data. In March 2011, however, the European Court of Justice declared this derogating provision in the Directive to be invalid on the grounds that the use of risk factors based on sex in connection with insurance premiums and bene…ts is incompatible with the principle of equal treatment for men and women under European Union Law (European Court of Justice, 2011). aversion, which also can be high or low, means that their preferences over uncertain income prospects can be represented as mean-variance preferences. An important consequence of this approach is that preferences over insurance contracts become quasilinear in the insurance premium and therefore in the information rent. Readers familiar with contract theory will acknowledge the usefulness of linearity in the information rent in specifying the incentive compatibility constraints. An additional advantage of mean-variance preferences is that they allow for an explicit characterization of the optimal menu of contracts.
The limitations of our approach follow immediately from these assumptions. We do not consider insurance contracts with either a deductible or a cap because such features would destroy the normality of net income. Second, the normality assumption implies a positive likelihood of negative losses, although this problem may be rendered of secondary importance by considering su¢ ciently high means and/or low variances for the losses. Perhaps the most important objection is that we have no skewness in the loss distribution, and in particular no strictly positive probability mass for a zero loss. Nevertheless, these are minor limitations when compared with the considerable advantages the approach o¤ers for characterizing the solution to a two-dimensional screening problem. To economize on space, our general characterization is restricted to a non-positive correlation between risk size and risk aversion.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we model the preferences of insurance takers and specify reimbursement contracts. In Section 3, we set up the problem faced by a monopolistic insurer. In Section 4, we characterize the optimal menu of contracts when insurees only di¤er in risk levels or risk aversion, as well as considering the case of perfect positive correlation. In Section 5, we assume that insurees di¤er in both respects simultaneously and discuss the …ve regimes (for contract menus) that may be optimal. For each regime, we characterize the optimal set of co-insurance rates. In Section 6, we determine which regime is dominating for which part of the parameter space. In Section 7, we interpret the testable prediction of Chiappori et al. (2006) in the light of our results. In Section 8, we trace out the consequences of allowing the monopolistic insurer to gender discriminate. Section 9 concludes the paper.
Except when otherwise stated, we have relegated all proofs of lemmas, theorems and propositions to our companion paper (Olivella and Schroyen, 2011).
Insurance takers and reimbursement contracts

Insurance takers
We assume that individuals are endowed with initial wealth e and a negative exponential von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function de…ned on …nal wealth y: u(y) = exp( ry), where r > 0 is the (constant) degree of absolute risk aversion. Initial wealth is subject to a random loss z that follows a normal distribution with mean and variance 2 . Agents have access to reimbursement insurance. A typical reimbursement contract pays out a compensation of 1 c per Euro loss, in return for a premium P . Ex post, …nal wealth is then given by
which ex ante is also normally distributed. We will express a contract C as a pair of a co-insurance rate c and a premium P : C = (c; P ). It is well known that under the assumptions made, the expected utility of the agent is representable by the certainty equivalent (CE) wealth function U =E(y) r 2 var(y). By replacing the mean and variance of …nal wealth, CE wealth is given by U = e P c r 2 c 2 2 .
From now on, we write def = r 2 , and assume that this product can be either high or low, and likewise for the expected loss: 2 f L ; H g and 2 f L ; H g,where L < H and L < H . The model can thus be interpreted in two ways: either individuals are equally risk averse but their losses have di¤erent variances, or the loss variance is identical but individuals have di¤erent degrees of risk aversion. Throughout, we adhere to the second interpretation and will refer to as risk aversion.
A person with characteristics ( i ; j ) is said to be of type ij. The share of ij individuals in the population is given by ij (i; j = H; L, P i;j ij = 1). We denote by k the fraction of individuals with expected loss k ( k = kL + kH ); likewise, k is the fraction of individuals with risk aversion k ( k = Lk + Hk ).
Incentive compatible contracts
When a person of type ij (i; j 2 fH; Lg) signs the contract C = (c; P ), her CE wealth, is
If instead she decides to remain uninsured, her CE wealth becomes e i 1 2 j , which is of course equivalent to accepting the contract (c; P ) = (1; 0), under which the agent bears the full loss but pays no premium. The CE rent that the agent enjoys from contract (c; P ) is then
Hence, the rent decreases with the co-insurance rate both via the expected loss and via risk aversion (if c > 0). The marginal willingness to pay for a slightly lower co-insurance rate c is
which increases linearly in c. Indi¤erence curves in the contract space (c; P ) are thus concave in c, and downward sloping for non-negative co-insurance rates. In addition, individuals with higher expected losses and/or greater risk aversion have a higher marginal willingness to pay. Figure 1 illustrates the indi¤erence curve that passes through the no-insurance point N = (1; 0). Given that the slope of the indi¤erence curve when it passes the P -axis is , it is easy to decompose the total willingness to pay for full insurance into the expected loss and the risk premium =2.
- Figure 1 hereWhen agent ij signs a contract intended for agent kl, the rent that the former receives is given by
It is useful to de…ne the following function:
Suppose now that type kl is truthful and receives rent R kl (c kl ; P kl ). Which rent does ij obtain when choosing the contract for kl? Using (4) and (7), the answer is given by
Thus, by pretending to be type kl, type ij can obtain type kl's rent plus . To see the usefulness of contract distortion, let us …x the rent that a truthful type kl receives under the contract (c kl ; P kl ). A marginal increase in the co-insurance rate for kl, dc kl > 0, would have to be compensated by a marginal decrease in the premium P kl . This has the following e¤ect on the rent for the mimicker ij:
Thus, the rent for ij goes down to the extent that: (i) ij is mimicking a type with a lower risk; and (ii) ij is mimicking a type with lower risk aversion. The intuition is the following. When raising the co-payment of a low risk (or risk-tolerant) individual, the decrease in the premium needed to compensate him is not too large, because of the small likelihood of needing that copayment (or because of the low valuation of the increase in the variance of …nal wealth). However, a person with a higher risk level or greater risk aversion who is tempted by this contract will dislike this change. This explains why increasing a co-insurance rate for some types will lower the rents of all those mimicking (and the mimickers of these mimickers) who have a higher risk, and will increase the rent of all those mimicking (and the mimickers of these mimickers) who have lower risk aversion. From now on, we simply write R ij for R ij (c ij ; P ij ) (i; j = L; H). Selfselection between contracts (c ij ; P ij ) and (c kl ; P kl ) then requires that
A necessary condition for incentive compatibility between contracts Hj and
with def = H L > 0. Similarly, incentive compatibility between contracts iH and
with def = H L and where it is assumed that c 0 (on which more below).
The double dimensionality leads in general to double crossing of the indifference curves of types HL and LH. Solving M W P HL (c) = M W P LH (c) for c yields c = . That is, in the (c; P ) space, the locus of tangency points between HL's and LH's indi¤erence curves is a vertical line at . For lower co-insurance rates, HL's indi¤erence curve crosses that of LH downwards from above, while for higher rates, this happens from below. The quadratic expressions for CE wealth ensure that if a crossing occurs at a rate c to the left of , then the second crossing occurs at c + , at the same distance to the right of -see Figure 2 . Hence, if we say that the indi¤erence curves of HL and LH form a lens, then 
The ratio D measures, in a unit-free fashion, the di¤erence in risk between two types. 10 The ratio x measures the degree of similarity along the riskaversion dimension. Using this notation, the locus of tangency points is therefore located at D
, so that for su¢ ciently small x, the tangency of the intermediate types'indi¤erence occurs at a co-insurance rate below unity. This makes it possible that both crossings become relevant for the analysis. 9 The right-(left-) crossing co-insurance rate is given by c
is the CE wealth for HL(LH). Hence, the size of the lens, de…ned as c
number. 10 Because the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion (r) measures twice the risk premium per unit of variance, we can conclude that the risk premium of a low-risk-averse type (RP L , say) equals
The insurance company
We consider a single, risk-neutral insurer with monopoly power on the market for reimbursement contracts. Her expected pro…ts when an agent of type ij has accepted a reimbursement contract (c; P ) is given by
Therefore, the iso-pro…t associated with type ij has slope i in the contract space (c; P ).
With full information, the monopolist will provide ij with full insurance (c ij = 0) at a premium that sets her rent equal to zero. Hence, using (4),
This yields a per capita payo¤ equal to = 1 2 j . The tangency line in Figure 1 thus corresponds to the highest feasible iso-pro…t line, and the pro…t that the insurer makes can be read o¤ from the dashed vertical axis on the right-hand side. Under full information, the insurer can extract the entire risk premium =2. In what follows, we will characterize the optimal co-insurance rates and the optimal rents. The corresponding premia can then be found with the help of (4).
Given (11), the insurer's total pro…t is equal to P i;j ij ij (c ij ; P ij ). From (4) and (11)-both evaluated at (c ij ; P ij )-and recalling that we can write R ij for R ij (c ij ; P ij ) (i.e., type ij's rent when truthful), we can express the insurer's total pro…t as
This objective function is to be maximized with respect to (c ij ; R ij ) (ij = H; L), subject to the usual voluntary participation and incentive compatibility constraints. As in most of the literature, to these constraints we add two additional sets of constraints that are needed to avoid false claims (see, e.g., Picard, 2000) . If a co-insurance rate is negative, the insurer refunds more than 100% of the losses, and the insuree will obviously have a strong incentive to overstate the size of the loss. On the other hand, if a co-insurance rate exceeds unity, the agent will have to be paid to accept such a contract (i.e., a negative premium). Once the agent has accepted the insurance, he would have to pay the insurer as well as bearing the loss once it occurs. It is clear that he would have strong incentives to understate the size of the loss (or even hide the loss altogether). Hence, we constrain co-insurance rates to lie in the interval [0; 1].
The monopolist thus solves the following problem:
The …rst set of constraints ensures voluntary participation, while the second ensures that all types self-select. The third set comprises the (reduced form) ex ante and ex post moral hazard constraints.
The following theorem provides the usual result of no-distortion-at-thetop (full insurance for the HH type) and no-rents-at-the-bottom. Except when otherwise stated, all proofs are relegated to our companion paper (Olivella and Schroyen, 2011) . Before characterizing the rest of the solution to the two-dimensional screening problem, it is useful to …rst consider the one-dimensional case.
One-dimensional screening
There are three instances in which screening becomes unidimensional. In the …rst instance, all agents have the same risk aversion; i.e., H = L = . This is the standard monopoly problem with just two types when insurees either bear a low or a high expected loss. The type distribution can be described by a single parameter H , the proportion of high risks in the population. We have the following theorem.
Theorem 2 When all agents have the same risk aversion, the optimal menu has c H = 0 and c L = minfD
The full insurance contract giving L zero rent would be selected by H as well. At a zero co-insurance rate, the slope of H's indi¤erence curve is steeper than that of L. If the insurer increases c L above zero, this will create a second-order reduction in pro…t from L, but a …rst-order gain in pro…t from H because the latter can be charged a strictly higher premium (for full insurance). Hence, it pays to start distorting Ls contract. The optimal co-insurance rate balances the gain in pro…t from H ( H ) with the loss in pro…ts from L ((1 H ) ). Notice that it may pay to exclude type L whenever H 1=(1 + D); i.e., whenever the proportion of low loss agents is su¢ ciently small-as expected.
The second instance in which the screening problem becomes unidimensional is when individuals di¤er in risk aversion only. Let H instead be the proportion of highly risk-averse types; i.e., those with = H (> L ). We have the following theorem.
Theorem 3 When all agents face the same expected loss, the optimal menu has c H = 0; and c L =
This result is less standard. With only di¤erences in risk aversion, the optimal solution is always at the corner. Either the low type is excluded or he receives full insurance. The reason for this "bang-bang"solution is that, unlike in the di¤erent risk scenario, at a zero co-insurance rate, both H's and L's indi¤erence curves are tangential to one another. Hence, distorting L's contract by raising the co-insurance rate now results in a second-order gain in pro…t from H, and it is the second-order condition that determines whether c L = 0 is a local maximum or minimum.
The …nal instance of unidimensional screening arises when risk levels and risk aversion are perfectly positively correlated. As it transpires from (5), we have M W P HH (c) > M W P LL (c) for any c. The two types are therefore once again unambiguously ordered. 
:
We now turn to the two-dimensional screening problem.
Two-dimensional screening
From now on, we let individuals not only di¤er in their risk levels, but also in their risk aversion. The insurance company then faces the following bivariate probability distribution of types:
The correlation between risk ( ) and risk aversion ( ) plays an important role in the analysis. This is given by
In what follows, we let represent the numerator of the correlation expres- 
The other parameters of the model, D and x, pertain to the characteristics of the insurance takers. This part of the parameter space is denoted as the types set T 0 :
It turns out that D and x are su¢ cient to describe the problem-we can discard the original parameters i and j (i; j = H; L).
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In our analysis, we focus on the case in which the correlation of characteristics is non-positive ( 0). Arguably, this is the most empirically relevant situation: highly risk-averse individuals tend to take more precautions and are thereby less likely to experience losses. Our model could be seen as a reduced form of a more general model in which individuals have initially taken such precautions before going to the insurance market. Second, there is a pragmatic reason for this restriction: under negative correlation, the typology of the equilibrium set of contracts is already complex, but mostly invariant to the degree of negative correlation. By contrast, with positive correlation, the degree of correlation starts to matter for characterizing the optimal contract menus in the parameter space. Thus, we restrict the set of distribution parameters to
The monotonicity conditions (9) and (10) imply that there are only two possible orderings of co-insurance rates, as follows: This result is intuitive. With Order 1, the only type that may envy the contract for HL is HH. Thus, the choice of c HL is only governed by weighing the pro…ts from these two types. Because they have the same risk levels, we can apply Theorem 3 to this subgroup. Given that the fraction of highly risk-averse individuals in this group is HH H , the result follows. In our technical companion paper, we show that no more than …ve regimes solve the monopolist's problem. By a regime, we mean a menu of contracts satisfying certain pooling or separation properties and coverage rankings. The …ve regimes are listed in Table 1 , and distinguished as to whether the degree of separation of the low-risk types, measured as c LL c LH , is larger or smaller than the size of the lens formed by the indi¤erence curves of HL and LH (`). 
with HH, HL and LH at c=0
The functions x BM ( ) and x CE ( ) are de…ned below in the discussion of Fig. 8 .
Note that Regime E distinguishes itself from the others in that Order 2 applies. Note also that full separation is never optimal. In the case of Order 1, the …rst part of Lemma (1) indicates that HL should be pooled with either HH or LH. In the case of Order 2, the suboptimality of full separation follows from the following Lemma (proven in the Appendix).
Lemma 2 (suboptimality of full separation under Order 2) Suppose that HH is indi¤erent between her own contract and that for LH, but strictly dislikes that for HL, and suppose that LH is indi¤erent between her own contract and that for HL, but strictly dislikes that for LL, and suppose that HL is indi¤erent between her own contract and that for LL. Then, pro…t can be increased by pooling HL with either LL or LH.
In the companion paper, we prove the …rst main result, stated below. Table 1 are potential solutions to the monopolist problem. If 0, no other menu structures can be optimal. In particular, full separation is never optimal.
Proposition 1 The …ve menu structures listed in
We now give a characterization of each regime. In the next section, we explain when it pays for the insurer to move from one regime to another.
Regime A
This regime pools the high-risk types at full insurance, and the low-risk types at high, but partial, insurance. This policy corresponds to one under which individuals di¤er only in their risk dimensions (Theorem 2). Below, we argue that Regime A is optimal if x is su¢ ciently large (i.e., when heterogeneity in risk aversion is weak), more speci…cally when x 1 LL . Because a non-positive correlation ensures that 1 LL >
HH H
, it follows from Lemma 1 that it is always optimal to pool HL with HH in Regime A.
From now on, we restrict the type space T 0 further by imposing an upper bound D A on D,
that is,
This restriction ensures that c A L < 1. In other words, it rules out exclusion of the low-risk types when individuals are almost equally risk averse. This condition ensures that our model encompasses the market situation described by Stiglitz (1977) .
Given that x 1 LL > H , it follows that when Regime A applies, the pooling of the low-risk types happens at a "low"co-insurance rate, viz., c
Regime M
This regime gives full insurance to HH, insures LH at a small but positive co-insurance rate, but excludes LL. Type HL is pooled with HH if x > - Figure 4 here-Below, we show that x < 1 LL is a necessary condition for Regime M to be optimal.
The optimal values for the co-insurance rates are given by Thus, the di¤erence between A and M is that the low-risk types (LH and LL), are now separated from one another, but the degree of separation is "small", in the sense that c LL c LH <`, the size of the lens.
Regime B
In this regime, the two low-risk types are separated by positioning them on each side of the lens. That is, they satisfy c LH +c LL 2
. We may distinguish between Regime Bf and Regime Bp, depending on whether LH obtains full insurance (c LH = 0) or partial insurance (c LH > 0), respectively. For the latter regime, we can also make a distinction based on whether LL individuals are included (BpI: c LL < 1) or excluded (BpX: c LL = 1) from insurance. Lemma 1 can be applied to determine whether HL should be pooled with HH (x 
Regime C Regime C is one under which everybody is fully insured, except for the LL individuals who face a very high co-insurance rate (CI) or are even excluded (CX). Moreover, the screening between LH and LL is now very thorough in the sense that c LL c LH >`. Consequently, c LL 2 . This regime is illustrated in Figure 6 .
- Figure 6 hereRegime C thus balances a high premium income from the "upper"types with the loss in pro…t from distorting LL's contract. Intuitively, with few LL individuals around, such distortion is attractive, and with hardly any of them around, it is even optimal to exclude them altogether.
We can summarize Regime C as follows:
.
Regime E
A common feature of all previous regimes is that Order 1 applies (c HL c LH ). In Regime E, the opposite is true: HL's contract is now severely distorted by being pooled with LL. This makes room for increasing the distortion on LH, which, in turn, allows the insurer to extract more rent from HH individuals. Again, if there are few low-risk-averse individuals around, it may pay to exclude these individuals from the market (EX), otherwise they are included but receive limited insurance (EI). Figure 7 illustrates.
- Figure 7 hereSeparation of LH from LL is once more minimal: c LL c LH <`. Under Order 1, separation of LL from LH is carried out to increase the pro…ts from HH, HL and LH at the cost of a lower pro…t from LL. Under Order 2, HL is pooled with LL so as to extract more rent from the highly risk-averse types, HH and LH. Across these two types, rent extraction is optimized in the standard way (cf Theorem 2).
Denoting the common co-insurance rate for HL and LL as c L , the optimal co-insurance rates for Regime E are
This concludes the presentation of the …ve regimes, or contract menus. Loosely speaking, one can say that the degree of separation between LH and LL, viz., c LL c LH , increases as one moves from A (c LL c LH = 0) into M (0 < c LL c LH <`), into B (0 < c LL c LH =`), and further into C (0 <`< c LL c LH ).
In Regime E, the degree of separation becomes minor again, but E is qualitatively di¤erent because it makes use of a di¤erent order.
Comparison of regimes
Having established the optimal co-insurance structure for each regime, we now investigate for which (D; x) combinations each of the regimes becomes optimal. The precise comparisons are relegated to the technical companion paper. Here, we limit ourselves mainly to a graphical presentation by partitioning the (D; x) space into subspaces according to which regime secures the monopolist the highest pro…t. We …rst establish the optimal menu in the neighbourhoods of the upper and lower boundaries for x. Thereafter, we sketch the optimal menus for intermediate values of x.
When there is no heterogeneity in risk aversion, we know from Theorem 2 that Regime A is optimal. By a continuity argument, this is also true for small di¤erences between H and L . Low-risk types will be partially insured while high-risk types obtain full insurance.
Theorem 5 As x ! 1, the optimal contract menu is de…ned by Regime A.
Inspection of (23) shows that for small enough x, it is optimal to exclude the two types with low-risk aversion (HL and LL) in Regime E. For the other regimes, one of the risk-tolerant types (i.e., HL) continues to buy insurance. However, if x approaches zero, the willingness to pay for insurance among highly risk-averse types (HH and LH) becomes in…nitely larger than that among low-risk-averse types. Therefore, it cannot be optimal to keep providing the latter with insurance, as this constrains the premia that can be charged to the former. Theorem 6 As x ! 0, the optimal contract menu is de…ned by Regime EX.
Before we consider when the other regimes become optimal, note that because Regimes A, M, B, and C all share the same order (Order 1), when moving from one regime into the adjacent one, at least one of the coinsurance rates changes continuously. Regime E, on the other hand, makes use of Order 2. The move from this regime into the adjacent one makes all co-insurance rates jump (except for c HH , which is always zero). Identi…cation of the borderline of regime E is then only possible by comparing the maximal pro…t functions. This is explained in more detail in our technical companion paper.
We now explain in a heuristic way the optimal regimes for intermediate x. For this purpose, suppose that x is close to unity to begin with; i.e., there is initially hardly any di¤erence in risk aversion, but then x steadily falls in value, which signi…es increased heterogeneity in risk aversion. With x close to unity, the optimal menu is given by Regime A. The size of the lens is
L . This makes it optimal to start screening the LL from the LH types: by providing LL with less coverage (at a lower premium), LH (and therefore also the high-risk types HH and HL) can be charged a higher premium. However, because LL was initially pooled with LH at the left-hand crossing, a marginal increase in c LH is impossible for incentive compatibility reasons. What is possible is to move LL from the left-hand crossing to the co-insurance rate corresponding to the right-hand crossing, and adjusting her premium to keep her rent at zero. This becomes optimal when x < 1 LL ; then, Regime BpI takes over. This is possible as long as the lens is not too big, i.e., if c
However, when D is large, the previous reshu-ing would involve a co-insurance rate for LL that exceeds unity (and a negative premium). Because this is ruled out, the best the insurer can do is to exclude LL and to extract all the rent from LH. This is what happens in Regime M. It can be shown that in this regime, the right-hand crossing, i.e., c M LH +`, is increasing in x. Hence, as x falls further, then at some stage, this right-hand-side crossing will coincide with the no-insurance point (1; 0). This happens when x falls short of x BM (D). 12 At that point, Regime BpX takes over from Regime M. See Figure 8 .
- Figure 8 hereWhen x falls far enough, it pays to increase the wedge between c LL and c LH , even in excess of`. That is, the point at which Regime C takes over 12 That is,
from Regime B. In the companion paper, we show that
where LL is given by (19) . When there is substantial heterogeneity in risk aversion (when x is very small), it becomes pro…table to screen the highly risk averse as a group from the low-risk-averse group. The only way to implement this is by switching to Order 2. Then, Regime E is optimal. In the companion paper, we also show that there exists a function, x CE ( H ; HH ; ; D), that is non-increasing in D, with x CE ( H ; HH ; ; D) <
This function is found by comparing the maximal pro…t under Regime C with the maximal pro…t under Regime E. Because there is continuity when switching from B to C, whereas there is discontinuity when switching from C to E, the question arising is whether C can be dominated by E for any x that makes C dominate B. In other words, does it make more sense to compare E with B ? This is illustrated in Figure 9 . The pro…t function E intersects with
g, while the function e E dominates C , indicating that once x falls short of e x, Regime B should be replaced by Regime E.
- Figure 9 hereFor each value of ( 0), we can de…ne a region R( ) in the ( H ; HH ) space such that this is indeed what happens:
Bundles in this region can be shown to be feasible. 13 Figure 10a-c displays R( ) for = 0; . Thus, if = 2 30 , then for almost all ( H ; HH ) that are feasible in combination with this value for (the area delineated by the dashed line), it transpires that the interval for which Regime C is optimal, [x CE ( H ; HH ; ; D); minf
g], is non-empty. For :089, "almost all"can be replaced by "any".
- Figure 10a , 10b, 10c hereWe therefore restrict the set of distribution parameters further to
However, from the previous discussion, A 2 is almost as large as A 1 . We now provide the second main result of the paper. Proposition 2 Suppose that ( H ; HH ; ) 2 A 2 . Then, the optimal menu structure as a mapping from T 1 into the menu set is as illustrated in Figure  8 .
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Recall that D measures the incentive for H -type individuals to mimic L -type individuals, normalized by (twice) the risk premium of the latter. A high co-insurance rate discourages the former group from applying for the contracts intended for the latter, and thus allows insurers to charge the former group more for full insurance. Regimes M, BX, CX, and EX all exclude LL; they become optimal for high levels of D.
On the other hand, x measures the extent of similarity in risk aversion. Dissimilarity warrants a contract menu that screens low-risk-averse consumers from highly risk-averse ones. The latter group is much more willing to pay for insurance coverage, and the monopolist takes advantage of this. Such screening is absent in Regime A and maximal in Regime EX , under which all risk-tolerant individuals are excluded from coverage. The result is a market with only highly risk-averse customers, who have private information on their expected losses. The standard screening problem thus applies.
We conclude this section by plotting in Figure 11 the optimal co-insurance rates for LL and LH underlying the di¤erent regimes (assuming that D <
such that Regime M can be ignored). The analysis of Section 8 is based on this …gure.
- Figure 11 here- 14 As explained in the previous section, whether HL is pooled with HH or with LH in Regimes Bp and M depends on whether x exceeds or falls short of 7 The positive correlation test Chiappori et al. (2006) showed that a common prediction of any model of a competitive insurance market with asymmetric information is a strictly positive relationship between the degree of coverage and the expected loss across contracts. This is quite a strong result, and we refer to it as positive monotonicity (PM). This property implies a positive correlation between coverage and risk, but the converse is not true.
In the empirical literature on testing for asymmetric information in insurance markets, researchers typically rely on estimating the correlation coe¢ cient between coverage and the expected loss, and then use a one-sided test to determine whether this coe¢ cient is statistically signi…cantly positive (see, e.g., Cohen and Siegelman, 2010; Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006) . The empirical evidence on positive correlation is somewhat weak; there is even evidence of negative correlation in some markets. 15 This is quite surprising, because the result of Chiappori et al. (2006) is general; conditional on the competition assumption, it holds for any combination of moral hazard and adverse selection in underlying risk. 16 As mentioned in the introduction, there are proposed theoretical explanations for this lack of evidence. One is the so-called "cherry picking argument" (Chiappori and Salanié, 2000) or "propitious selection" (Hemenway, 1990) , which combines adverse selection in risk preference (but not in the underlying risk) with moral hazard. The argument is that if individuals take precautions having purchased insurance, then highly risk-averse individuals 15 The later phenomenon is termed "advantageous or propitious selection". In regard to life insurance, see, e.g., Cawley and Philipson (1999) and McCarthy and Mitchell (2003) , and in long-term care, see, e.g., Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) . On the other hand, Olivella and Vera (2011) show that in duplicate or substitutive private health insurance systems (in which the public and (competitive) private insurance sectors o¤er the same portfolio of services), if (but not only if) there is heterogeneity in risks only, then propitious selection into private insurance should be observed if and only if information on risks is symmetric. 16 When the literature refers to moral hazard, this could encompass two distinct phenomena. One relates to individuals who enjoy more coverage having less of an incentive to undertake precautionary behaviour, which makes them observationally more risky. The other arises because one does not necessarily observe actual risk but the usage of, say, health services. Because coverage implies a lower cost of accessing these services, individuals may use more of these services because they have more coverage, not because they are more risky. Notice that both types of moral hazard reinforce the positive correlation. Of course, one of the econometric issues is that, even after observing some positive correlation, it is hard to disentangle the adverse selection and either of the two moral hazard e¤ects.
will increase their coverage as well as take more precautions, everything else being equal. This may then result in a negative correlation between observed risk and coverage. 17 Because the optimal menu in a monopoly market with two-dimensional screening may display Order 2, PM will cease to hold; for a subset of types (LH and HL), coverage is negatively related to risk size. This of course does not imply that the correlation between risk and coverage is negative, because PM does hold for other subsets of types (between HH on the one hand and LH and LL on the other). This also suggests that a su¢ ciently negative correlation between risk and risk aversion (i.e., a su¢ ciently small ) ensures a negative correlation between coverage and risk size. This is shown below.
In fairness, Chiappori et al. (2006) pointed out that in a monopoly, the PM property may be violated. They do this by starting with a model in which only preference heterogeneity exists (cf. Section 4), and then by introducing an in…nitesimal amount of exogenous risk heterogeneity that is perfectly negatively correlated with risk heterogeneity (i.e., the more riskaverse agents have a slightly smaller accident probability). We show that the PM property does not hold whenever Regime E applies, even if the underlying risk and risk preference are independently distributed.
Translated into our setting, the Chiappori et al. (2006) proposition may be stated as follows:
Consider two contracts C a and C b that are o¤ered on the market. Suppose that: (i) C a gives more coverage then C b , i.e., c a < c b ; and (ii) the per capita pro…t generated by contract a does not exceed that of contract b, (C a ) (C b ). Then, (iii) the expected loss to those consumers signing up for contract a should exceed the expected loss of those consumers signing up for contract b, i.e., (C a ) (C b ).
It is easy to see that property (iii) is satis…ed in all regimes except for Regime E. In that regime, the contract for LH has more coverage than the contract for the low-risk-averse individuals (LL and HL). The PM property would then require that 
, irrespective of which optimal values the co-insurance rates take under Regime E.
Performing a positive correlation test on our model would amount to calculating the covariance across contracts between 1 c(C) and (C), as follows:
As the second part of the following proposition shows, when the optimal regime is EI, this covariance is negative only if the correlation between expected loss and risk aversion, , is su¢ ciently negative. In other words, the advantageous selection among LH and HL, described by part (i), may exactly o¤set the standard adverse selection, such that any correlation between risk and coverage vanishes. Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) show that the long-term care insurance market may su¤er from asymmetric information, despite the absence of evidence for a positive correlation between risk and coverage. Our model helps in interpreting this evidence.
Gender discrimination
Crocker and Snow (1986) have shown that imperfect categorical discrimination in insurance-such as gender discrimination-always expands the e¢ -ciency frontier. Hoy (1982) showed how categorization based on a signal may lead to a Pareto improvement in a competitive insurance market if the signal conveys information about the level of risk. In this section, we ask when such e¢ ciency gains arise in a monopolistic market structure. We show that a Pareto improvement is possible if the signal, such as gender, is informative about risk aversion.
Let us write p( ; ; g) as the likelihood function that an arbitrary insuree has an expected loss of , risk aversion of and gender g 2 fm; wg. A monopolist who is allowed to condition on gender will, for each gender, g, design an optimal contract menu based on the risk-aversion ratio, x, the risk di¤erence parameter, D, and the probability matrix,
We now assume that risk aversion is a su¢ cient statistic for gender with respect to the expected loss:
Condition S means that within a given risk-aversion class, the observation of a person's gender carries no extra information about the risk class to which this person belongs. 19 In general, su¢ ciency is not enough to break the link between gender and expected loss. If female drivers are highly risk averse, and if this attitude leads them to careful driving, then there will still be a connection between gender and expected loss. This last connection is broken by the assumption that expected loss is independently distributed of risk aversion-i.e., risk aversion has no impact on driving. This allows us to state the following result.
Lemma 3
If the likelihood function p( ) satis…es Condition S and if and are independently distributed, then and g are also independently distributed:
Thus, these assumptions support the conclusion reached by the European Commission-that gender is insigni…cant in explaining risk type.
Because a gender-discriminating …rm will use the probability functions p( ; jg) (g = m; w), rather than the single function p( ; ), to design menus, and because pro…ts and consumer rents depend on the co-insurance rate c LL , it is important to determine the e¤ect of p( ) on c LL . For this purpose, let us assume that D <
so that we can ignore Regime M. From proposition 2, it follows that without discrimination, the upper boundaries of regimes C, Bf, and BpI are determined by the parameters LL and LH . Fixing x, L (and therefore H = 1 L ) allows one to trace out the optimal value of c LL as a function of LL . This yields Figure  12 , in which it is assumed that
(1 + L )(1 x). This means that the curve for LL's optimal co-insurance rate is ‡at for some range of LL values; this is equivalent to assuming that
- Figure 
. There is now ample evidence that men are on average less risk averse than women. 20 For our model, this means that p( L jw) < p( L ) < p( L jm). An insurance company that is allowed to gender discriminate, having observed the customer's gender g, will update the probability LL in the following way:
where the …rst equality sign follows from Condition S and the second follows from independence. Thus, L and H do not change when gender is observed.
Suppose now that (24) holds, and suppose that the proportion of LL individuals as a whole, the proportion among men, and the proportion among women, are LL ; LLjm , and LLjw , respectively. Suppose also that these proportions are as illustrated in Figure 13 .
- Figure 13 hereThen, we can conclude that because
the co-insurance rate for LL women will remain at its no-discrimination value, and the rents of LH women, HL women, and HH women will not change because of discrimination (and LL women continue to receive zero rent). On the other hand, because
the optimal co-insurance rate for LL men will drop below its no-discrimination value, and therefore, all men will receive more rent when o¤ered the optimal contract menu for men (except LL men, who continue to receive zero rent). 21 The insurance company will increase its total pro…ts because of …nding it optimal to choose a new menu for its male clientele-it could have stuck to the same menu as in the no-discrimination case. Thus, a Pareto improvement is possible by allowing gender discrimination. As can be seen from the …gure, conditions (25) and (26) are not only su¢ cient for a Pareto improvement, but also necessary. We summarize this result in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Suppose that Condition S holds, and that and are independently distributed. Suppose that (24) holds. For given values of x; L , and D, allowing gender discrimination will lead to a Pareto improvement in the insurance market if and only if conditions (25) and (26) hold.
Condition (24) is satis…ed when the proportion of low-risk individuals, L , is not too small in relation to x. The intuition for Proposition 4 is the following. Because men are on average less risk averse, the "male" market consists of more LL types than does the overall market. This makes the distortion of the LL contract that 21 Because the optimal menu for men is of the type Bp, the rents are given as follows: R HH = R HL + was optimal for the entire market too costly for the "male"market: o¤ering LL men a lower co-insurance rate (in return for a higher premium) increases pro…ts from this market segment su¢ ciently to compensate for the lower rents extracted from the "higher" male types. Hence, all men bene…t, and so does the monopolist.
Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the outcome in a monopolistic insurance market when the insurer is only aware of the statistical distribution of the expected loss and the level of risk aversion of its customers. We formulated a meanvariance model that results in quasilinear preferences over contracts; we identi…ed the …ve contract menus that emerge in equilibrium; and for each menu, we derived the optimal co-insurance rates. Next, we identi…ed for each menu the subset of parameter values for which that menu is optimal. We did this under non-positive correlation between the two characteristics.
We found:
it is never optimal to fully separate all the types. In other words, there will always be some pooling of types in equilibrium;
the greater is the heterogeneity in the expected loss, the more it pays to screen the low-risk from the high-risk types, by imposing a high co-insurance rate on the former; the greater is the heterogeneity in terms of risk aversion, the more it pays to screen the low-risk-averse from the highly risk-averse by imposing a high co-insurance rate on the former; and the property of positive monotonicity between coverage and expected loss need no longer hold-neither does the property of positive correlation.
We also identi…ed an open set of parameter values such that when the female distribution of risk aversion …rst order stochastically dominates the male distribution, allowing gender discrimination results in a Pareto improvement in this market. Hence, our analysis shows that one should be careful when abolishing gender categorization; even when gender itself does not (statistically) a¤ect the expected level of losses or claims, it may a¤ect the outcome in an imperfectly competitive insurance market so that nobody gains and some participants become worse o¤. the above expression are positive. From (27) , the denominator is positive. Therefore, cov < 0 () < 
